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Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale


  • Lebrun, Bernard


In the presence of resale and under more general assumptions than Zhengʼs (2002), implementation of Myersonʼs (1981) optimal allocation with two bidders is achieved through the second-price auction. In a special class of asymmetric n-bidder models, it is achieved through the English auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Lebrun, Bernard, 2012. "Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 731-751.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:731-751
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.007

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Rod Garratt & Thomas Tröger, 2006. "Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 753-769, May.
    2. Charles Zhoucheng Zheng, 2002. "Optimal Auction with Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2197-2224, November.
    3. Bernard Lebrun, 2010. "First-price auctions with resale and with outcomes robust to bid disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 165-178.
    4. Harrison Cheng & Guofu Tan, 2010. "Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 45(1), pages 253-290, October.
    5. Haile,P.A., 1999. "Auctions with resale," Working papers 33, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    6. Green, Jerry R & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1987. "Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 69-94, January.
    7. Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-943, June.
    8. Rodney J. Garratt & Thomas Trˆger & Charles Z. Zheng, 2009. "Collusion via Resale," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(4), pages 1095-1136, July.
    9. Bernard Caillaud & Jacques Robert, 2005. "Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(2), pages 127-143, April.
    10. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    11. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, June.
    12. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2006. "Monopoly with resale," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 362-375, June.
    13. Isa Hafalir & Vijay Krishna, 2008. "Asymmetric Auctions with Resale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 87-112, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:indorg:v:55:y:2017:i:c:p:58-90 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Papers 1405, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    3. Celik, Gorkem & Yilankaya, Okan, 2017. "Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 148-174.
    4. Bernard Lebrun, 2015. "Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(2), pages 245-275, June.
    5. Ding, Wei & Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2013. "Horizontal mergers with synergies: Cash vs. profit-share auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 382-391.
    6. Che, XiaoGang & Lee, Peter & Yang, Yibai, 2013. "The impact of resale on entry in second price auctions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 163-168.
    7. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    8. Virág, Gábor, 2016. "Auctions with resale: Reserve prices and revenues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 239-249.

    More about this item


    Optimality; Resale; Second-price auction; English auction; Heterogeneous bidders; Efficiency; Behavioral bidding strategies; No-regret property; Multiplicity of equilibria;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions


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