On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
If a TU game is extendable, then its core is a stable set. However, there are many TU games with a stable core that are not extendable. A coalition is vital if there exists some core element x such that none of the proper subcoalitions is effective for x. It is exact if it is effective for some core element. If all coalitions that are vital and exact are extendable, then the game has a stable core. It is shown that the contrary is also valid for matching games, for simple flow games, and for minimum coloring games.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Biswas, A. K. & Parthasarathy, T. & Potters, J. A. M. & Voorneveld, M., 1999. "Large Cores and Exactness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-12, July.
- J. R. G. van Gellekom & J. A. M. Potters & J. H. Reijnierse, 1999. "Prosperity properties of TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Game Theory Society, vol. 28(2), pages 211-227.
- T. E. S. Raghavan & Tamás Solymosi, 2001. "Assignment games with stable core," International Journal of Game Theory, Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 177-185.
- Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2007. "Extendable Cooperative Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(6), pages 1069-1078, December.
- T. Raghavan & Peter Sudhölter, 2005. "The modiclus and core stability," International Journal of Game Theory, Game Theory Society, vol. 33(4), pages 467-478, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:633-644. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.