Leveled Commitment Contracts and Strategic Breach
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- Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
- R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
- Cheng, John Q & Wellman, Michael P, 1998.
"The WALRAS Algorithm: A Convergent Distributed Implementation of General Equilibrium Outcomes,"
Society for Computational Economics, vol. 12(1), pages 1-24, August.
- John Q. Cheng & Michael P. Wellman, 1995. "The WALRAS Algorithm: A Convergent Distributed Implementation of General Equilibrium Outcomes," Computational Economics 9508001, EconWPA.
- Andersson, Martin R. & Sandholm, Tuomas W., 2001. "Leveled commitment contracts with myopic and strategic agents," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 615-640, March.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
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