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The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs

Author

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  • D'Agostino, Elena
  • Seidmann, Daniel J.

Abstract

Is it better to present evidence first or second in trials if witnesses cannot lie, and the litigants share all available witnesses? We address this question by defining preferences over playing games via their equilibrium correspondences. Exploiting this partial ordering over games, we show that litigants cannot prefer to lead, but can prefer to follow; the judge/jury may also prefer some litigant to lead, but only if the litigants each prefer to follow. Allowing a litigant to choose whether to lead after observing the available witnesses does not benefit either that litigant or the judge/jury.

Suggested Citation

  • D'Agostino, Elena & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2022. "The order of presentation in trials: Plaintive plaintiffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 328-336.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:132:y:2022:i:c:p:328-336
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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