Stackelberg-Nash bargaining-based low-carbon scheduling for multiple integrated multi-energy systems

The coordination of multiple integrated multi-energy systems (IMES) presents a promising approach for enhancing energy recycling and reducing carbon emissions. However, existing studies have not fully addressed carbon emissions reduction through a comprehensive integration of supply-side measures, load-side management, and energy transactions across multiple IMES. To address this gap, this work proposes a low-carbon scheduling framework based on Stackelberg-Nash bargaining for multiple IMES. Specifically, hydrogen is flexibly blended into combined heat and power (CHP) and gas boiler (GB) at variable mixing ratios. To encourage load aggregator (LA) participation in carbon reduction, a demand response (DR) management scheme incorporating pricing incentives is developed based on a Stackelberg game model. In addition, a peer-to-peer (P2P) transaction mechanism for methanol and electricity among multiple IMES is established. The benefit allocation method comprehensively considers the contribution of each IMES to the transaction of electricity and methanol, as well as carbon emissions reduction. Furthermore, through the constraint linearization of the power flow of the distribution network and temperature of the thermal network, the feasibility of the proposed model is validated using an extended IEEE bus system coupled with a 6-node thermal subsystem. Simulation results show that the proposed method can significantly reduce carbon emissions by 43.99 % and increase the benefits by 86.43 % compared to not engaging in a cooperative game. Furthermore, the electricity and methanol trading strategy reduces carbon dioxide emissions by 3175 kg via hydrogen-methanol-hydrogen technology, compared to electricity trading alone.