IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/enepol/v164y2022ics0301421522001161.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Adjusting the aim of capacity mechanisms: Future-proof reliability metrics and firm supply calculations

Author

Listed:
  • Brito-Pereira, Paulo
  • Mastropietro, Paolo
  • Rodilla, Pablo
  • Barroso, Luiz Augusto
  • Batlle, Carlos

Abstract

Capacity mechanisms are now deemed a regulatory mainstay in liberalised power system decarbonisation. These instruments aim to ensure sufficient resource adequacy with a mix able to meet the reliability target set by the regulator. Remuneration in capacity mechanisms depends on so-called firm supply (calculated from de-rating factors or capacity credits), taken as a proxy for each resource’s expected long-term contribution to system adequacy. Most adequacy assessment and de-rating methods used to calculate security of supply were developed for power systems very different from today’s and tomorrow’s, in which renewables account for a higher share of the mix and demand is more elastic. Regulators the world over are already revising these methods, although that seldom involves an overall rethink of their general approach. Drawing from theoretical considerations and international best practice, this article defines an updated theoretical framework for the resource adequacy problem against the backdrop of the challenges ahead for the power sector. The conclusions include recommendations for resilient reliability metrics and de-rating calculation methods.

Suggested Citation

  • Brito-Pereira, Paulo & Mastropietro, Paolo & Rodilla, Pablo & Barroso, Luiz Augusto & Batlle, Carlos, 2022. "Adjusting the aim of capacity mechanisms: Future-proof reliability metrics and firm supply calculations," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:164:y:2022:i:c:s0301421522001161
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2022.112891
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421522001161
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.enpol.2022.112891?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rodilla, Pablo & García-González, Javier & Baíllo, Álvaro & Cerisola, Santiago & Batlle, Carlos, 2015. "Hydro resource management, risk aversion and equilibrium in an incomplete electricity market setting," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 365-382.
    2. Newbery, David, 2016. "Missing money and missing markets: Reliability, capacity auctions and interconnectors," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 401-410.
    3. Andreis, Luisa & Flora, Maria & Fontini, Fulvio & Vargiolu, Tiziano, 2020. "Pricing reliability options under different electricity price regimes," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    4. Petitet, Marie & Finon, Dominique & Janssen, Tanguy, 2017. "Capacity adequacy in power markets facing energy transition: A comparison of scarcity pricing and capacity mechanism," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 30-46.
    5. Ozbafli, Aygul & Jenkins, Glenn P., 2016. "Estimating the willingness to pay for reliable electricity supply: A choice experiment study," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 443-452.
    6. Lambin, Xavier, 2020. "Integration of Demand Response in Electricity Market Capacity Mechanisms," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    7. Söder, Lennart & Tómasson, Egill & Estanqueiro, Ana & Flynn, Damian & Hodge, Bri-Mathias & Kiviluoma, Juha & Korpås, Magnus & Neau, Emmanuel & Couto, António & Pudjianto, Danny & Strbac, Goran & Burke, 2020. "Review of wind generation within adequacy calculations and capacity markets for different power systems," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
    8. Paolo Mastropietro, Pablo Rodilla and Carlos Batlle, 2017. "Performance Incentives in Capacity Mechanisms: Conceptual Considerations and Empirical Evidence," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
    9. Neuhoff, Karsten & De Vries, Laurens, 2004. "Insufficient incentives for investment in electricity generations," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 253-267, December.
    10. Karsten Neuhoff & Laurens De Vries, 2004. "Insufficient Incentives for Investment," Working Papers EP42, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    11. Joskow, Paul L., 2008. "Capacity payments in imperfect electricity markets: Need and design," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 159-170, September.
    12. Freeman, Gerad M. & Apt, Jay & Moura, John, 2020. "What causes natural gas fuel shortages at U.S. power plants?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    13. Mastropietro, Paolo & Rodilla, Pablo & Batlle, Carlos, 2019. "De-rating of wind and solar resources in capacity mechanisms: A review of international experiences," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 253-262.
    14. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2019. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1059-1078.
    15. Mastropietro, Paolo & Rodilla, Pablo & Rangel, Lina Escobar & Batlle, Carlos, 2020. "Reforming the colombian electricity market for an efficient integration of renewables: A proposal," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 139(C).
    16. Cynthia Bothwell and Benjamin F. Hobbs, 2017. "Crediting Wind and Solar Renewables in Electricity Capacity Markets: The Effects of Alternative Definitions upon Market Efficiency," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(KAPSARC S).
    17. Bidwell, Miles, 2005. "Reliability Options: A Market-Oriented Approach to Long-Term Adequacy," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 11-25, June.
    18. Mastropietro, Paolo & Fontini, Fulvio & Rodilla, Pablo & Batlle, Carlos, 2018. "The Italian capacity remuneration mechanism: Critical review and open questions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 659-669.
    19. Peter Cramton & Axel Ockenfels & Steven Stoft, 2013. "Capacity Market Fundamentals," Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Chaves, J. P. & Cossent, R. & Gómez San Román, T. & Linares, P. & Rivier, M., 2023. "An assessment of the European electricity market reform options and a pragmatic proposal," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2325, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Christos K. Simoglou & Pandelis N. Biskas, 2023. "Capacity Mechanisms in Europe and the US: A Comparative Analysis and a Real-Life Application for Greece," Energies, MDPI, vol. 16(2), pages 1-32, January.
    3. Brito-Pereira, Paulo & Rodilla, Pablo & Mastropietro, Paolo & Batlle, Carlos, 2022. "Self-fulfilling or self-destroying prophecy? The relevance of de-rating factors in modern capacity mechanisms," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 314(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Keppler, Jan Horst & Quemin, Simon & Saguan, Marcelo, 2022. "Why the sustainable provision of low-carbon electricity needs hybrid markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    2. Simshauser, Paul, 2020. "Merchant renewables and the valuation of peaking plant in energy-only markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    3. Brito-Pereira, Paulo & Rodilla, Pablo & Mastropietro, Paolo & Batlle, Carlos, 2022. "Self-fulfilling or self-destroying prophecy? The relevance of de-rating factors in modern capacity mechanisms," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 314(C).
    4. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2019. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1059-1078.
    5. Simshauser, P., 2020. "Merchant utilities and boundaries of the firm: vertical integration in energy-only markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2039, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Han Shu & Jacob Mays, 2022. "Beyond capacity: contractual form in electricity reliability obligations," Papers 2210.10858, arXiv.org.
    7. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2018. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Working Paper Series in Production and Energy 27, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP).
    8. Sebastian Schäfer & Lisa Altvater, 2019. "On the functioning of a capacity market with an increasing share of renewable energy," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 59-84, August.
    9. Mastropietro, Paolo & Rodilla, Pablo & Batlle, Carlos, 2019. "De-rating of wind and solar resources in capacity mechanisms: A review of international experiences," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 253-262.
    10. Mier, Mathias, 2021. "Efficient pricing of electricity revisited," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    11. Simshauser, Paul, 2019. "Missing money, missing policy and Resource Adequacy in Australia's National Electricity Market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 1-1.
    12. Brown, David P., 2018. "Capacity payment mechanisms and investment incentives in restructured electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 131-142.
    13. Fontini, Fulvio & Vargiolu, Tiziano & Zormpas, Dimitrios, 2021. "Investing in electricity production under a reliability options scheme," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    14. Mastropietro, Paolo & Herrero, Ignacio & Rodilla, Pablo & Batlle, Carlos, 2016. "A model-based analysis on the impact of explicit penalty schemes in capacity mechanisms," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 406-417.
    15. Kozlova, M. & Overland, I., 2022. "Combining capacity mechanisms and renewable energy support: A review of the international experience," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    16. Huang, Zhenyu & Liu, Youbo & Li, Kecun & Liu, Jichun & Gao, Hongjun & Qiu, Gao & Shen, Xiaodong & Liu, Junyong, 2023. "Evaluating long-term profile of demand response under different market designs: A comparison of scarcity pricing and capacity auction," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 282(C).
    17. Simshauser, Paul, 2022. "Rooftop solar PV and the peak load problem in the NEM's Queensland region," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    18. Simshauser, P. & Gilmore, J., 2020. "Is the NEM broken? Policy discontinuity and the 2017-2020 investment megacycle," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2048, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    19. Naoki Makimoto & Ryuta Takashima, 2023. "Capacity Market and Investments in Power Generations: Risk-Averse Decision-Making of Power Producer," Energies, MDPI, vol. 16(10), pages 1-19, May.
    20. Simshauser, Paul & Tian, Yuan & Whish-Wilson, Patrick, 2015. "Vertical integration in energy-only electricity markets," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 35-56.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:164:y:2022:i:c:s0301421522001161. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.