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Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties

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  • Alon, Tzvi
  • Haviv, Moshe

Abstract

A single machine processes a random number of identical jobs on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis. Processing times are independent and identically distributed with a general integral distribution. Each job is held by a strategic player who needs to choose a time slot to arrive at. The individual objective is to reduce the sum of two types of linear in time costs: lateness and waiting. The resulting decision making model is, then, a symmetric non-cooperative game. We derive a symmetric Nash equilibrium for this game, and discuss its structural properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Alon, Tzvi & Haviv, Moshe, 2022. "Discrete-time strategic job arrivals to a single machine with waiting and lateness penalties," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 303(1), pages 480-486.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:303:y:2022:i:1:p:480-486
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.02.032
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Amihai Glazer & Refael Hassin & Liron Ravner, 2018. "A strategic model of job arrivals to a single machine with earliness and tardiness penalties," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(4), pages 265-278, April.
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    6. Sakuma, Yutaka & Masuyama, Hiroyuki & Fukuda, Emiko, 2020. "A discrete-time single-server Poisson queueing game: Equilibria simulated by an agent-based model," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 283(1), pages 253-264.
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