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Pyramidal groups and debt

  • Bianco, Magda
  • Nicodano, Giovanna

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-4G7GFSG-1/2/9b42f106d67ef0e3d5bb2d34c5da6e3c
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 50 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
Pages: 937-961

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:50:y:2006:i:4:p:937-961
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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  1. Perotti, Enrico C. & Gelfer, Stanislav, 2001. "Red barons or robber barons? Governance and investment in Russian financial-industrial groups," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1601-1617, October.
  2. Ekkehart Boehmer, 1999. "Business Groups, Bank Control and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers," Working Papers 1999.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. Hellmann, Thomas & Stiglitz, Joseph, 2000. "Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 281-304, February.
  4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  5. Jeremy C. Stein, 1995. "Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources," NBER Working Papers 5101, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Laurence Booth, 2001. "Capital Structures in Developing Countries," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 87-130, 02.
  7. Marco Pagano & Fabio Panetta & and Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 27-64, 02.
  8. Hellwig, Martin F, 1981. "Bankruptcy, Limited Liability, and the Modigliani-Miller Theorem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 155-70, March.
  9. Volpin, Paolo F., 2002. "Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 61-90, April.
  10. Nicodano, Giovanna, 1998. "Corporate groups, dual-class shares and the value of voting rights," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(9), pages 1117-1137, September.
  11. Khanna, Tarun, 2000. "Business groups and social welfare in emerging markets: Existing evidence and unanswered questions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 748-761, May.
  12. Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin, 2001. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(4), pages 943-77.
  13. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1995. " What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1421-60, December.
  14. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, . "Testing Tradeoff and Pecking Order Predictions about Dividends and Debt.”," CRSP working papers 506, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  15. Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, 2000. "Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(2), pages 867-891, 04.
  16. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1999. "A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control," NBER Working Papers 7203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1991. " The Theory of Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 297-355, March.
  18. Gertner, Robert H & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1994. "Internal versus External Capital Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1211-30, November.
  19. Giacinta Cestone & Chiara Fumagalli, 2005. "The Strategic Impact of Resource Flexibility in Business Groups," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 193-214, Spring.
  20. Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, 2001. "Business Groups and Risk Sharing around the World," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe02, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
  21. Fabio Schiantarelli & Alessandro Sembenelli, 2000. "Form of Ownership and Financial Constraints:Panel Data Evidence From Flow of Funds and Investment Equations," Empirica, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 175-192, June.
  22. Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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