Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem
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References listed on IDEAS
- Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
- Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
- Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 73-93, August.
- Sungwhee Shin & Sang-Chul Suh, 2000. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a simple production economy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(3), pages 523-532.
- Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October.
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