IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies

  • Goswami, Mridu Prabal

    ()

    (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi)

  • Sen, Arunava

    ()

    (Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi)

  • Mitra, Manipushpak

    ()

    (Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata)

In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auction-design, we show that in a specific quasi-linear domain, every Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof SCF satisfying non-bossiness and a mild continuity property is dictatorial. The result holds for an arbitrary number of agents but the two-person version does not require either the non-bossiness or continuity assumptions. It also follows that the dictatorship conclusion holds on any superset of this domain. We also provide a minimum consumption guarantee result in the spirit of Serizawa and Weymark (2003).

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20140361/10810/325
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 9 (2014)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages:

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1214
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econtheory.org

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 73-93, 08.
  2. Alejandro Saporiti, 2008. "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing," Wallis Working Papers WP55, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  3. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
  4. Serizawa, Shigehiro, 2002. "Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 219-241, October.
  5. James Schummer, 1996. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 47-56.
  6. Momi, Takeshi, 2013. "Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1237-1254.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1214. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martin J. Osborne)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.