Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with Cobb–Douglas preferences
We show that in a pure exchange economy with two agents and a finite number of goods, there exists no strategy-proof, Pareto-efficient, and non-dictatorial social choice allocation function on any local Cobb–Douglas preference domain. This is a slight extension of a result proved by Hashimoto ( 2008 ). Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
Volume (Year): 40 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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- Biung-Ghi Ju, 2003. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 73-93, 08.
- Momi, Takeshi, 2013. "Note on social choice allocation in exchange economies with many agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1237-1254.
- Kazuhiko Hashimoto, 2008. "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the Cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(3), pages 457-473, October.
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