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Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a simple production economy

Author

Listed:
  • Sungwhee Shin

    (Department of Economics, University of Windsor, Ontario Canada N9B3P4)

  • Sang-Chul Suh

    (Department of Economics, University of Windsor, Ontario Canada N9B3P4)

Abstract

We consider an economy with two agents, "firm" and "worker." The firm owns a technology which transforms a single input into a single output and the worker owns a limited amount of input good, for example, leisure. The firm is interested in profit measured in terms of output and the worker's preferences are defined over the input-output space. Manipulability comes not only from a lack of information about the (worker's) preferences but also about the technology. With a possibility for manipulation, can we still obtain efficient allocations? We show that there is no allocation mechanism which is Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial.

Suggested Citation

  • Sungwhee Shin & Sang-Chul Suh, 2000. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a simple production economy," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(3), pages 523-532.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:17:y:2000:i:3:p:523-532
    Note: Received: 30 March 1998/Accepted: 06 July 1999
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    Cited by:

    1. Sang-Chul Suh & Yuntong Wang, 2023. "The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 60(3), pages 477-501, April.
    2. Leroux, Justin, 2004. "Pooling Private Technologies: Improving upon Autarky," Working Papers 2004-08, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    3. Shin, Sungwhee & Suh, Sang-Chul, 2007. "Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 103-108, July.
    4. Sang-Chul Suh & Yuntong Wang, 2018. "The Proportional Solution in a Permit Sharing Problem," Working Papers 1802, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.

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