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Public good provision in legislatures: the dynamics of enlargements

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  • Koppel, Oliver

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  • Koppel, Oliver, 2004. "Public good provision in legislatures: the dynamics of enlargements," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 43-47, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:83:y:2004:i:1:p:43-47
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-327, March.
    3. Pecorino, Paul, 1999. "The effect of group size on public good provision in a repeated game setting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 121-134, April.
    4. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Oliver Koppel, 2005. "Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 229-243, November.
    2. Paul Pecorino & Akram Temimi, 2007. "Public good provision in a repeated game: The role of small fixed costs of participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(3), pages 337-346, March.

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