An oligarchy theorem in fixed agenda without Pareto conditions
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- M. Carmen SÂnchez & Josep E. Peris, 1999.
"Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 81-97.
- Josep Enric Peris Ferrando & Mª Carmen Sánchez, 1995. "Veto In Fixed Agenda Social Choice Correspondences," Working Papers. Serie AD 1995-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December.
- Fountain, John & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1982. "Collective Choice Rules without the Pareto Principle," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 23(2), pages 299-308, June.
- Vincenzo Denicolo, 1989.
"Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Corrispondences and Social Decision Functions,"
84, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Denicolo Vincenzo, 1993. "Fixed Agenda Social Choice Theory: Correspondence and Impossibility Theorems for Social Choice Correspondences and Social Decision Functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 324-332, April.
- Jerry S. Kelly & Donald E. Campbell, 1998. "Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 147-162.
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