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Human Right to Water Act and drinking water compliance: A synthetic control approach

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  • Cho, Chanheung

Abstract

This paper evaluates the impact of California’s Human Right to Water Act (HR2W) on drinking water compliance using a synthetic control approach. We construct a counterfactual from other U.S. states to estimate the 2016 policy’s causal effect. The results show a significant decline in the enforcement priority of public water systems (PWSs) in California relative to the synthetic counterpart. Robustness checks confirm that this decline is not driven by confounding factors like federal regulations. These findings provide empirical evidence on the effectiveness of targeted water governance policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Cho, Chanheung, 2025. "Human Right to Water Act and drinking water compliance: A synthetic control approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 253(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:253:y:2025:i:c:s0165176525001983
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112361
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, 2011. "The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 3-24, Winter.
    2. Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
    3. David E. M. Sappington, 1991. "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 45-66, Spring.
    4. Abadie, Alberto & Diamond, Alexis & Hainmueller, Jens, 2010. "Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 105(490), pages 493-505.
    5. Earnhart, Dietrich H. & Glicksman, Robert L., 2015. "Coercive vs. cooperative enforcement: Effect of enforcement approach on environmental management," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 135-146.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chanheung Cho & Younghyeon Jeon, 2026. "Effect of a Policy Intervention to Stimulate Lead Service Line Replacement: Evidence from Wisconsin," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 89(3), pages 1-27, March.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models

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