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Corporation social responsibility and dynamic agency under jump risk

Author

Listed:
  • Shi, Yu
  • Song, Dandan
  • Luo, Pengfei

Abstract

In this paper, we attempt to clarify how agency conflicts affect the firm’s corporation social responsibility (CSR, henceforth) implementation level by developing a dynamic agency model. Numerical results demonstrate that agency conflicts make the level of CSR lower than that without an agency problem. The optimal level of CSR is high and positive only when it is close to the optimal compensation payoff boundary. Moreover, various factors that may affect the optimal level of CSR are investigated.

Suggested Citation

  • Shi, Yu & Song, Dandan & Luo, Pengfei, 2025. "Corporation social responsibility and dynamic agency under jump risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:247:y:2025:i:c:s0165176524006323
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112148
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Niu, Yingjie & Yang, Jinqiang & Wu, Yaoyao & Zhao, Siqi, 2022. "Corporate social responsibility and dynamic liquidity management," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
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    6. Zhang, Yuqian & Yang, Zhaojun, 2024. "Dynamic incentive contracts for ESG investing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    7. Harrison Hong & Neng Wang & Jinqiang Yang, 2023. "Mitigating Disaster Risks in the Age of Climate Change," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(5), pages 1763-1802, September.
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    10. Meng, Weizhen & Li, Shilin & Yang, Jinqiang, 2024. "Mitigating disaster risks caused by carbon emissions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 241(C).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporation social responsibility; Agency conflict; Disaster shock;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • E23 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Production
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates

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