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Axiomatizations of convex compromise rules for redistribution of non-negative income

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  • Zou, Zhengxing
  • Tan, Zhibin

Abstract

We adopt an axiomatic approach to explore the redistribution rules for income redistribution problems. We formalize two axioms concerning how changes in the income of one or a pair of individuals affect others’ rewards. Together with the standard axioms of efficiency, order preservation, and non-negativity, our resulting axioms of equal benefits from additional income and pairwise reallocation invariance characterize the family of convex compromise rules. We show that the family can also be characterized by efficiency, equal benefits from additional income, nullity, and monotonicity. Strengthening equal benefits from additional income to differential invariance leads to alternative axiomatizations, where pairwise reallocation invariance is superfluous in the former.

Suggested Citation

  • Zou, Zhengxing & Tan, Zhibin, 2023. "Axiomatizations of convex compromise rules for redistribution of non-negative income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:229:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523002537
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111228
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Yukihiko Funaki & Yukio Koriyama & Satoshi Nakada, 2025. "A Characterization of Egalitarian and Proportional Sharing Principles: An Efficient Extension Operator Approach," Papers 2510.24388, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

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