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Differentially monotonic redistribution of income

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  • Casajus, André

Abstract

We suggest a differential version of monotonicity for redistribution rules: whenever the differential of two persons’ income weakly increases, then the differential of their post-redistribution rewards also weakly increases. Together with efficiency and non-negativity, differential monotonicity characterizes redistribution via taxation at a fixed rate and equal distribution of the total tax revenue.

Suggested Citation

  • Casajus, André, 2016. "Differentially monotonic redistribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 112-115.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:141:y:2016:i:c:p:112-115
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Moulin, Herve, 1985. "Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-linear Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 49-67, January.
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    3. Casajus, André, 2015. "Monotonic redistribution of non-negative allocations: A case for proportional taxation revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 95-98.
    4. Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, 1985. "The Route to a Progressive Flat Tax," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(2), pages 465-480, Fall.
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    6. Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, 1996. "Fairness and Efficiency in the Flat Tax," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 52772, September.
    7. Casajus, André, 2015. "Monotonic redistribution of performance-based allocations: a case for proportional taxation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yokote, Koji & Casajus, André, 2017. "Weak differential monotonicity, flat tax, and basic income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 100-103.
    2. Koji Yokote & Takumi Kongo & Yukihiko Funaki, 2021. "Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(1), pages 81-98, July.
    3. Martínez, Ricardo & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., 2022. "Laissez-faire or full redistribution?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    4. Piera Mazzoleni & Elisa Pagani & Federico Perali, 2023. "On the Curvature Properties of “Long” Social Welfare Functions," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(7), pages 1-14, March.
    5. Takaaki Abe & Satoshi Nakada, 2017. "Monotonic Redistribution: Reconciling Performance-Based Allocation and Weighted Division," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(04), pages 1-14, December.
    6. Zou, Zhengxing & Tan, Zhibin, 2023. "Axiomatizations of convex compromise rules for redistribution of non-negative income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Redistribution; Flat tax; Basic income; Differential monotonicity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General

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