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Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values

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  • Casajus, André

Abstract

We revisit Kalai and Samet’s (1987) first characterization of the class of weighted Shapley values. While keeping efficiency, additivity, and the null player property from the original characterization of the symmetric Shapley value, they replace symmetry with positivity and partnership consistency. The latter two properties, however, are neither implied by nor related to symmetry. We suggest relaxations of symmetry that together with efficiency, additivity, and the null player property characterize classes of weighted Shapley values. For example, weak sign symmetry requires the payoffs of mutually dependent players to have the same sign. Mutually dependent players are symmetric players whose marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them are zero.

Suggested Citation

  • Casajus, André, 2019. "Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 75-78.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:176:y:2019:i:c:p:75-78
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.031
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Casajus, André, 2018. "Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 105-123.
    2. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
    3. Chun, Youngsub, 1991. "On the Symmetric and Weighted Shapley Values," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(2), pages 183-190.
    4. Casajus, André, 2018. "Sign symmetry vs symmetry: Young’s characterization of the Shapley value revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 59-62.
    5. E. Calvo & Juan Carlos Santos, 2000. "Weighted weak semivalues," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(1), pages 1-9.
    6. Nowak, A.S. & Radzik, T., 1995. "On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 389-405.
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    Cited by:

    1. Casajus, André, 2021. "Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    2. Sylvain Béal & Florian Navarro, 2020. "Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies," Working Papers 2020-01, CRESE.
    3. Besner, Manfred, 2022. "The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    4. Kongo, Takumi, 2019. "Players’ nullification and the weighted (surplus) division values," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
    5. Sylvain Béal & Sylvain Ferrières & Adriana Navarro‐Ramos & Philippe Solal, 2023. "Axiomatic characterizations of the family of Weighted priority values," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 19(4), pages 787-816, December.
    6. Jun Su & Yuan Liang & Guangmin Wang & Genjiu Xu, 2020. "Characterizations, Potential, and an Implementation of the Shapley-Solidarity Value," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(11), pages 1-20, November.
    7. Besner, Manfred, 2019. "Parallel axiomatizations of weighted and multiweighted Shapley values, random order values, and the Harsanyi set," MPRA Paper 92771, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Sokolov, Denis, 2022. "Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 76-90.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    TU game; Weighted Shapley values; Sign symmetry; Mutual dependence; Weak sign symmetry; Superweak sign symmetry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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