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Licensing and innovation: A comment

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  • Colombo, Stefano
  • Filippini, Luigi

Abstract

According to Chang et al. (2013), social welfare under licensing is lower than under no-licensing if the R&D efficiency is high. We show that this result is not correct, as when R&D efficiency is high social welfare is higher under licensing than under no-licensing.

Suggested Citation

  • Colombo, Stefano & Filippini, Luigi, 2014. "Licensing and innovation: A comment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(3), pages 353-356.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:353-356
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.036
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Salant, Stephen W, 1984. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 247-250, March.
    2. San Martín, Marta & Saracho, Ana I., 2010. "Royalty licensing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 284-287, May.
      • San Martín Lizarralde, Marta & Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel, 2009. "Royalty Licensing," IKERLANAK 6548, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    3. Heywood, John S. & Li, Jianpei & Ye, Guangliang, 2014. "Per unit vs. ad valorem royalties under asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 38-46.
    4. Chang, Ray-Yun & Hwang, Hong & Peng, Cheng-Hau, 2013. "Technology licensing, R&D and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 396-399.
    5. Stefano Colombo & Luigi Filippini, 2015. "Patent Licensing with Bertrand Competitors," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(1), pages 1-16, January.
    6. Nancy T. Gallini & Ralph A. Winter, 1985. "Licensing in the Theory of Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 237-252, Summer.
    7. Luigi Filippini, 2005. "Licensing Contract In A Stackelberg Model," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 73(5), pages 582-598, September.
    8. Mukherjee, Arijit & Mukherjee, Soma, 2013. "Technology licensing and innovation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 499-502.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ding, Rong & Ko, Chiu Yu, 2021. "Does licensing improve welfare with rent dissipation?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    2. Carlo Capuano & Iacopo Grassi, 2020. "Imperfect patent protection, licensing, and willingness to pay for the innovation," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 47(2), pages 333-359, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patent licensing; Innovation; Social welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing

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