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Testing post-cartel pricing during litigation


  • Erutku, Can


Harrington (2004) shows that conspirators can have incentives to maintain high prices after the cartel’s discovery to reduce damages they are likely to pay. We exploit the existence of a discovered retail gasoline price-fixing cartel in the province of Quebec to test this theory. The empirical results provide some support for Harrington (2004)’s predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Erutku, Can, 2012. "Testing post-cartel pricing during litigation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 339-342.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:3:p:339-342 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.033

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Joseph E. Harrington, 2004. "Post-Cartel Pricing During Litigation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 517-533, December.
    2. Newey, Whitney & West, Kenneth, 2014. "A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 33(1), pages 125-132.
    3. Connor, John M. & Bolotova, Yuliya, 2006. "Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1109-1137, November.
    4. Can Erutku & Vincent A. Hildebrand, 2010. "Conspiracy at the Pump," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 223-237, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:oup:jcomle:v:10:y:2014:i:1:p:217-256. is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    Post-cartel; Price manipulation; Residual collusion; Gasoline;

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies


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