Oligopoly price discrimination with many prices
The model of price discrimination in Cournot-Nash oligopoly is extended to the case of many prices, analogous to 1st degree monopoly price discrimination. In the limit all viable customers are served, but the price charged the keenest customers is well below the highest price charged by a monopoly.
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- David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
- Levent Kutlu, 2009. "PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN STACKELBERG COMPETITION -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(2), pages 364-364, 06.
- Hazledine, Tim, 2006. "Price discrimination in Cournot-Nash oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(3), pages 413-420, December.
- Tim Hazledine, 2010. "Pricing, Competition and Policy in Australasian Air Travel Markets," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 44(1), pages 37-58, January.
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