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Liquidity runs with endogenous information acquisition

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  • Zwart, Sanne

Abstract

This paper analyzes a liquidity run model in which investors strategically acquire private information. The availability of information can eliminate the multiplicity typical for models without private information. Even for intermediate priors equilibria without private information can now be unique.

Suggested Citation

  • Zwart, Sanne, 2008. "Liquidity runs with endogenous information acquisition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 64-67, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:64-67
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    2. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2001. "Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, pages 139-182, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Hellwig, Christian, 2002. "Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 191-222, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel, 2015. "Information acquisition in global games of regime change," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 387-428.
    2. Hans-Werner Sinn & John Hassler & Gilles Saint-Paul & Giancarlo Corsetti & Michael P. Devereux & Tim Jenkinson & Jan-Egbert Sturm & Xavier Vives, 2009. "Chapter 2: The Financial Crisis," EEAG Report on the European Economy, CESifo, vol. 0, pages 59-122, February.

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