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Corruption in a model of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit sources and credit subsidy policy

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  • Chaudhuri, Sarbajit
  • Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh

Abstract

The present note develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing dominant moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially. The existing moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on the informal interest rate. We show that there may arise a case where an increase in the supply of formal credit results in an increase in the informal interest rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. This shows that apart from (i) asymmetric information on the part of informal sector lenders (Bose, 1998), (ii) an increase in the probability of default of all informal sector lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz 1997), and the (iii) possibility of informal lenders to collude (Floro and Ray 1997), the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit might be another factor responsible for the policy of vertical linkage to break down.

Suggested Citation

  • Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh, 2011. "Corruption in a model of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit sources and credit subsidy policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 2596-2599.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:28:y:2011:i:6:p:2596-2599
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2011.07.021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Gupta, Manash Ranjan, 1996. "Delayed formal credit, bribing and the informal credit market in agriculture: A theoretical analysis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 433-449, December.
    2. Braverman, Avishay & Guasch, J. Luis, 1986. "Rural credit markets and institutions in developing countries: Lessons for policy analysis from practice and modern theory," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 14(10-11), pages 1253-1267.
    3. Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1998. "Moneylenders and bankers: price-increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 485-518, April.
    4. Gupta, Manash Ranjan & Chaudhuri, Sarbajit, 1997. "Formal Credit, Corruption and the Informal Credit Market in Agriculture: A Theoretical Analysis," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(254), pages 331-343, May.
    5. Bose, Pinaki, 1998. "Formal-informal sector interaction in rural credit markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 265-280, August.
    6. Floro, Maria Sagrario & Ray, Debraj, 1997. "Vertical Links between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 34-56, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Ghosh Dastidar, Krishnendu, 2011. "Vertical linkage between formal and informal credit markets: corruption and credit subsidy policy," MPRA Paper 35563, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Lahkar, Ratul & Pingali, Viswanath, 2016. "Expansion and welfare in microfinance: A screening model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 1-7.
    3. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Gupta, Manash Ranjan, 2014. "International factor mobility, informal interest rate and capital market imperfection: A general equilibrium analysis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 184-192.
    4. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Ghosh Dastidar, Krishnendu, 2014. "Vertical Linkage between Formal and Informal Credit Markets, Corruption and Credit Subsidy policy: A Note," MPRA Paper 53344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Gupta, Manash Ranjan, 2013. "Endogenous Capital Market Imperfection, Informal Interest Rate Determination and International Factor mobility in a General Equilibrium Model," MPRA Paper 51157, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Pi, Jiancai & Chen, Xuyang, 2016. "The impacts of capital market distortion on wage inequality, urban unemployment, and welfare in developing countries," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 103-115.
    7. repec:bla:scotjp:v:64:y:2017:i:3:p:283-309 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Mandal, Biswajit, 2012. "Bureaucratic reform, informal sector and welfare," MPRA Paper 36072, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Formal/informal credit markets; Interest rates Journal of Economic Literature;

    JEL classification:

    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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