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Measuring domination in matching-network configurations

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  • Cui, Zhiwei
  • Hwang, Yan-An

Abstract

A matching-network configuration consists of a directed network with a finite set of nodes, a finite set of agents, and a matching between the set of nodes and the set of agents. The directed network represents the dominance or dependence relationships between entities, and the matching represents agents’ ownership of entities. We introduce four relational power measures for the set of agents, the β-measure, the score-measure, the β-hybrid-measure, and the score-hybrid-measure. When each agent is matched to only one node, and vice versa, the β- and β-hybrid-measures are reduced to the β-measure in the directed network, and the score- and score-hybrid-measures are reduced to the score-measure in the directed network. We show that the four relational power measures can be axiomatically characterized by the same symmetry axiom, the same individual independence (or individual monotonicity) axiom, and four different efficiency axioms.

Suggested Citation

  • Cui, Zhiwei & Hwang, Yan-An, 2025. "Measuring domination in matching-network configurations," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:151:y:2025:i:c:s0264999325002111
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107216
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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