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Is implicit cooperation reasonable for the economy? Corporate environmentalism under Kantian behavior

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  • Kurata, Hiroshi
  • Long, Ngo Van

Abstract

We investigate the effects on the market when firms adopt Kantian behavior, inherently fostering implicit cooperation in the context of corporate environmentalism. We focus on oligopolistic firms’ environmental technology investments and compare investment levels under the Kantian equilibrium with those under the Nash equilibrium and socially optimal levels. When firms are concerned about the environmental impact of others, their environmental investment under the Kantian equilibrium exceeds that under the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, Nash equilibrium investment is consistently below the social optimum, while Kantian equilibrium investment can either match or approach the socially optimal level. The Kantian equilibrium investment may exceed the socially optimal level if a firm have substantial environmental concerns.

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  • Kurata, Hiroshi & Long, Ngo Van, 2025. "Is implicit cooperation reasonable for the economy? Corporate environmentalism under Kantian behavior," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:146:y:2025:i:c:s0264999325000240
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2025.107029
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects

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