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Dynamic R&D with spillovers: A comment

Author

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  • Smrkolj, Grega
  • Wagener, Florian

Abstract

Cellini and Lambertini [2009. Dynamic R&D with spillovers: competition vs cooperation. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 33, 568–582] study a dynamic R&D game with spillovers. This comment demonstrates that, contrary to what is claimed in their paper, the game is not state redundant and the open-loop Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect.

Suggested Citation

  • Smrkolj, Grega & Wagener, Florian, 2016. "Dynamic R&D with spillovers: A comment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 453-457.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:73:y:2016:i:c:p:453-457
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2016.10.011
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1990. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers: Erratum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 641-642, June.
    2. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2005. "R&D Incentives and Market Structure: Dynamic Analysis," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 85-96, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Xiaohong Han & Hua Feng, 2023. "The impact of foreign R&D on the innovation performance of China’s high-tech industry and its spatial spillover effect," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 18(3), pages 1-18, March.
    2. Smrkolj, Grega & Wagener, Florian, 2019. "Research among copycats: R&D, spillovers, and feedback strategies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 82-120.
    3. Jeroen Hinloopen & Grega Smrkolj & Florian Wagener, 2017. "Research and Development Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 174(2), pages 567-612, August.
    4. Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2022. "Dynamic analysis of R&D in an oligopoly under general demand and cost functions," OPSEARCH, Springer;Operational Research Society of India, vol. 59(2), pages 694-710, June.
    5. Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2021. "Advertising in an oligopoly with differentiated goods under general demand and cost functions: A differential game approach," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(6), pages 619-639, December.
    6. Jiafeng Gu, 2021. "Determinants of biopharmaceutical R&D expenditures in China: the impact of spatiotemporal context," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 126(8), pages 6659-6680, August.
    7. Jeroen Hinloopen & Grega Smrkolj & Florian Wagener, 2016. "R&D Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 16-048/II, Tinbergen Institute.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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