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Rules, reputation and macroeconomic policy coordination : David Currie and Paul Levine, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1993) HB[UK pound]45, 430 pp

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  • Cripps, M. W.

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  • Cripps, M. W., 1996. "Rules, reputation and macroeconomic policy coordination : David Currie and Paul Levine, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1993) HB[UK pound]45, 430 pp," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-3), pages 521-523.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:20:y:1996:i:1-3:p:521-523
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    2. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
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