Subjective-uncertainty-oriented dynamic renting framework for energy storage sharing

In recent years, shared energy storage has gained significant attention for mitigating the supply and demand imbalance caused by the intermittency of distributed renewable energy. Considering the subjective perception of prosumers when facing uncertainty, this paper proposes a new dynamic competitive on-demand renting framework for energy storage capacity (ESC) sharing to increase energy storage utilization, increase energy storage operator (ESO) profits, and reduce prosumer costs. In this framework, a demand-based dynamic capacity pricing mechanism is introduced, modeling the relationship between ESO and prosumers as a Stackelberg game while establishing a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problem among prosumers. ESO determines the dynamic capacity pricing mechanism, while prosumers determine the hourly renting capacity based on demand. In capacity sharing, prospect theory is introduced for the first time to describe the subjective perceptions of prosumers when facing the uncertainty of renewable energy. Moreover, the existence of SE and the uniqueness of GNE are analyzed, followed by a summary and proposal of a method to determine the existence of equilibrium in a nested generalized non-cooperative Stackelberg game. Simulations show the effectiveness of the proposed framework on improving the ESC utilization rate, the impact of subjective perceptions on prosumers’ decision-making, and the profit favorability of the correct estimation of subjective perceptions on ESO. Specifically, the framework increases ESO utilization by 24.07% and profit by 13.73%.