IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/advacc/v62y2023ics0882611023000202.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Clawback policy enforcement: To disclose or not to disclose

Author

Listed:
  • Cha, Yunshil
  • Gill, Susan
  • Wong-On-Wing, Bernard

Abstract

The SEC proposed in 2015 to require the disclosure of incentive compensation recovery efforts by companies' boards of directors. While such disclosure of enforcement can signal the effectiveness of corporate governance as the SEC suggested, firms have argued that the proposed enforcement disclosure may harm executives' reputation regardless of their involvement in misstatement because the clawback includes a no-fault clause. Results of our experimental study suggest that when the board does not disclose its clawback enforcement, investors perceive weak corporate governance, particularly when a restatement results from an intentional misstatement. This, in turn, leads investors to be less willing to invest than when clawback enforcement is disclosed. We also find that investors' perception of management reputation is not negatively affected following the board's clawback enforcement disclosure. Overall, our study provides insights into the potential effect of the SEC's proposal requiring the disclosure of clawback enforcement and addresses concerns raised in comment letters.

Suggested Citation

  • Cha, Yunshil & Gill, Susan & Wong-On-Wing, Bernard, 2023. "Clawback policy enforcement: To disclose or not to disclose," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:advacc:v:62:y:2023:i:c:s0882611023000202
    DOI: 10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100661
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0882611023000202
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.adiac.2023.100661?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dichu Bao & Simon Yu Kit Fung & Lixin (Nancy) Su, 2018. "Can Shareholders Be at Rest after Adopting Clawback Provisions? Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 35(3), pages 1578-1615, September.
    2. Chan, Lilian H. & Chen, Kevin C.W. & Chen, Tai-Yuan & Yu, Yangxin, 2012. "The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on earnings quality and auditor behavior," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 180-196.
    3. Kyung, Hangsoo & Lee, Hakyin & Marquardt, Carol, 2019. "The effect of voluntary clawback adoption on non-GAAP reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 175-201.
    4. Ed Dehaan & Frank Hodge & Terry Shevlin, 2013. "Does Voluntary Adoption of a Clawback Provision Improve Financial Reporting Quality?," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(3), pages 1027-1062, September.
    5. Denis, Diane K., 2012. "Mandatory clawback provisions, information disclosure, and the regulation of securities markets," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 197-200.
    6. Barton, Jan & Mercer, Molly, 2005. "To blame or not to blame: Analysts' reactions to external explanations for poor financial performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 509-533, September.
    7. Brink, Alisa G. & Eller, C. Kevin & Gao, Lei, 2021. "He wouldn't, but I would: The effects of pronoun-induced language vividness in whistleblowing policies," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    8. Erkens, Michael H.R. & Gan, Ying & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2018. "Not all clawbacks are the same: Consequences of strong versus weak clawback provisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 291-317.
    9. Chan, Lilian H. & Chen, Kevin C.W. & Chen, Tai-Yuan, 2013. "The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on bank loan contracting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 659-679.
    10. Palmrose, Zoe-Vonna & Richardson, Vernon J. & Scholz, Susan, 2004. "Determinants of market reactions to restatement announcements," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 59-89, February.
    11. Xinshu Zhao & John G. Lynch & Qimei Chen, 2010. "Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: Myths and Truths about Mediation Analysis," Journal of Consumer Research, Journal of Consumer Research Inc., vol. 37(2), pages 197-206, August.
    12. Mark A. Chen & Daniel T. Greene & James E. Owers, 2015. "The Costs and Benefits of Clawback Provisions in CEO Compensation," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 108-154.
    13. Mburu, Henry Kimani & Tang, Alex P., 2018. "The adoption of voluntary clawback provisions and the broader commitment hypothesis," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 60-69.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Patrick Velte, 2020. "Determinants and consequences of clawback provisions in management compensation contracts: a structured literature review on empirical evidence," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 13(3), pages 1417-1450, November.
    2. Daoju Peng & Jianfu Shen & Simon Yu Kit Fung & Eddie C. M. Hui & Kwokyuen Fan, 2024. "The Valuation Effect and Consequences of Clawback Adoption in Real Estate Investment Trusts," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 68(2), pages 274-317, February.
    3. Dina El Mahdy, 2020. "The unintended consequences of voluntary adoption of clawback provisions on managerial ability," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(4), pages 3493-3526, December.
    4. Mburu, Henry Kimani & Tang, Alex P., 2018. "The adoption of voluntary clawback provisions and the broader commitment hypothesis," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 60-69.
    5. Ilona Babenko & Benjamin Bennett & John M Bizjak & Jeffrey L Coles & Jason J Sandvik, 2023. "Clawback Provisions and Firm Risk," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(2), pages 191-239.
    6. Erkens, Michael H.R. & Gan, Ying & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2018. "Not all clawbacks are the same: Consequences of strong versus weak clawback provisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 291-317.
    7. William D. Brink & Jonathan H. Grenier & Jonathan S. Pyzoha & Andrew Reffett, 2019. "The Effects of Clawbacks on Auditors’ Propensity to Propose Restatements and Risk Assessments," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 158(2), pages 313-332, August.
    8. Kyung, Hangsoo & Lee, Hakyin & Marquardt, Carol, 2019. "The effect of voluntary clawback adoption on non-GAAP reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 175-201.
    9. Bulte, Erwin & List, John A. & van Soest, Daan, 2021. "Incentive spillovers in the workplace: Evidence from two field experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 137-149.
    10. Chan, Lilian H. & Chen, Kevin C.W. & Chen, Tai-Yuan, 2013. "The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on bank loan contracting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 659-679.
    11. Hanni Liu & Harrison Liu & Jennifer Yin, 2023. "The impact of clawback provisions on executive cash compensation," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 35-62, July.
    12. George D. Cashman & David M. Harrison & Christine A. Panasian, 2016. "Clawback Provisions In Real Estate Investment Trusts," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 39(1), pages 87-114, March.
    13. Mark A. Chen & Daniel T. Greene & James E. Owers, 2015. "The Costs and Benefits of Clawback Provisions in CEO Compensation," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(1), pages 108-154.
    14. Aghanya, Daniel & Agarwal, Vineet & Poshakwale, Sunil, 2020. "Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), stock price informativeness and liquidity," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    15. Takuya Iwasaki & Shota Otomasa & Atsushi Shiiba & Akinobu Shuto, 2012. "The role of accounting conservatism in executive compensation contracts (Forthcoming in Journal of Business Finance and Accounting)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-370, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Jul 2018.
    16. Bill Francis & Iftekhar Hasan & Jong Chool Park & Qiang Wu, 2015. "Gender Differences in Financial Reporting Decision Making: Evidence from Accounting Conservatism," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 32(3), pages 1285-1318, September.
    17. Patrick Velte, 2023. "The link between corporate governance and corporate financial misconduct. A review of archival studies and implications for future research," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 353-411, February.
    18. Jahn, Johannes & Brühl, Rolf, 2019. "Can bad news be good? On the positive and negative effects of including moderately negative information in CSR disclosures," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 117-128.
    19. Grant, Stephanie M. & Hodge, Frank D. & Sinha, Roshan K., 2018. "How disclosure medium affects investor reactions to CEO bragging, modesty, and humblebragging," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 68, pages 118-134.
    20. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2014_001 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Jin, Zhi & Yang, Yinan & Zhang, Liguang, 2021. "Geographic proximity and cross-region merger and acquisitions: Evidence from the opening of high-speed rail in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:advacc:v:62:y:2023:i:c:s0882611023000202. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/advances-in-accounting/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.