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Employer-provided health insurance and equilibrium wages with two-sided heterogeneity

Author

Listed:
  • Arnaud Chéron

    (EDHEC Business School)

  • Pierre-jean Messe

    (Université du Mans - Centre d'Etudes pour l'Emploi)

  • Jerome Ronchetti

    (Université du Mans)

Abstract

ClassificationThis paper develops an equilibrium search model that allows firms to invest in worker's health. Heterogeneous health endowment of the employee is not observed by the employer, and firms also differ regarding their productivity. We emphasize that wage and health expenditure policies of the employer are tightly related, and show how those policies relate to firms' type. A noticeable implication is that there is an ambiguous relationship between firm's type, wages and health expenditures.-JEL: J3

Suggested Citation

  • Arnaud Chéron & Pierre-jean Messe & Jerome Ronchetti, 2015. "Employer-provided health insurance and equilibrium wages with two-sided heterogeneity," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 1109-1117.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-14-01033
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Naoki Aizawa & Hanming Fang, 2020. "Equilibrium Labor Market Search and Health Insurance Reform," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(11), pages 4258-4336.
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    3. Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, 1991. "The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons from Workers' Compensation Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 5, pages 111-144, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 177-183, May.
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    6. Grossman, Michael, 1972. "On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(2), pages 223-255, March-Apr.
    7. Brigitte C. Madrian, 1994. "Employment-Based Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Is there Evidence of Job-Lock?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(1), pages 27-54.
    8. Matthew S. Dey & Christopher J. Flinn, 2005. "An Equilibrium Model of Health Insurance Provision and Wage Determination," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 571-627, March.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    wages; search; health expenditures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

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