Are better vaccines really better? The case of a simple stochastic epidemic SIR model
We consider a model of vaccine market where the buyer is centralized and shows an endogenous demand function based on a simple stochastic SIR model. When the seller is a monopoly, we show that better vaccines (in the sense of greater efficiency or inducing less side-effects) do not imply greater total surplus, greater buyer surplus or even greater profits. Since we consider a centralized buyer, our results cannot be caused by the well-known epidemiological externality of vaccination.
Volume (Year): 33 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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[Monopolpreisbildung mit negativen Netzwerkeffekten am Beispiel von Impfstoffen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2003-06, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
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