A developed theoretical model of paid and unpaid work in healthcare supply
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References listed on IDEAS
- Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 1998.
"Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-19, January.
- Chalkley, M. & Malcomson, J.M., 1995. "Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9514, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Le Grand, Julian, 2003. "Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199266999.
- Siciliani, Luigi, 2009. "Paying for performance and motivation crowding out," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 68-71, May.
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Keywordsunpaid work; financial incentives; crowding effect; time allocation;
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