IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Labour decreasing returns, industry-wide union and Cournot-Bertrand profit ranking. A note

  • Luciano Fanti

    ()

    (University of Pisa)

  • Nicola Meccheri

    ()

    (University of Pisa)

While the received literature on unionized duopolies emphasized the key role of inter-union competition in reversing the standard Cournot-Bertrand profit ranking, in this paper such issue is studied in a framework with labour decreasing returns and a centralized (industry-wide) union, hence in a context where inter-union competition is clearly absent. Nevertheless, it is shown that the "reversal result" can apply provided that union is sufficiently wage oriented. Furthermore, it is pointed out that, in the special case of total wage bill maximization, it applies for a larger range of the degree of product substitutability under a central union rather than under firm-specific unions.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2012/Volume32/EB-12-V32-I1-P84.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 894-904

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00841
Contact details of provider:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521464673 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Luciano Fanti & Nicola Meccheri, 2010. "The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential in a differentiated duopoly with unions and labour decreasing returns," Discussion Papers 2010/107, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  3. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
  4. Dowrick, Steve & Spencer, Barbara J, 1994. "Union Attitudes to Labor-Saving Innovation: When Are Unions Luddites?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 316-44, April.
  5. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2011. "A Note on Trade Unions, Unemployment Insurance, and Endogenous Growth," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 37(2), pages 270-280.
  6. Dhillon, Amrita & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2002. "A generalised wage rigidity result," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 285-311, March.
  7. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Vlassis, Minas, 2000. "Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union-oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 261-281, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00841. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.