A Comment on "The consequences of the minimum wage when other wages are bargained over"
Cahuc, Saint-Martin, and Zylberberg (2001) show numerically that a minimum wage hike can increase both skilled and unskilled employment in a right-to-manage wage bargaining setting. This comment demonstrates that this result crucially depends on an implicitly unrealistic choice for the skilled workers' alternative wage.
Volume (Year): 30 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Cahuc, P. & Saint-Martin, A. & Zylberberg, A., 2001. "The consequences of the minimum wage when other wages are bargained over," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 337-352, February.
- Manning, Alan, 1995.
"How Do We Know That Real Wages Are Too High?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 110(4), pages 1111-25, November.
- Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 1995.
"The consequences of minimum wage laws Some new theoretical ideas,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 245-255, February.
- James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 1991. "The Consequences of Minimum Wage Laws: Some New Theoretical Ideas," NBER Working Papers 3877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Henri R. SNEESSENS & Fatemeh SHADMAN-MEHTA, 1995. "Real Wages, Skill Mismatch and Unemployment Persistence (FRANCE, 1962-1989)," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 37-38, pages 255-292.
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