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A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Tommy Andersson

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

This paper revisits the fair and optimal allocation mechanism (Sun and Yang, Economics Letters 81:73-79, 2003) and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. The proof is valid for general preferences, it is simple and it is short.

Suggested Citation

  • Tommy Andersson, 2009. "A general strategy-proof fair allocation mechanism revisited," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 1717-1722.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00269
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I3-P19.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tadenuma, Koichi & Thomson, William, 1991. "No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1755-1767, November.
    2. Sun, Ning & Yang, Zaifu, 2003. "A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 73-79, October.
    3. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 1987. "Erratum [Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 489-489, March.
    4. Andersson, Tommy & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2008. "Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 350-354, November.
    5. Eric S. Maskin, 1987. "On the Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: George R. Feiwel (ed.), Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy, chapter 11, pages 341-349, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-1039, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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