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Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements

Author

Listed:
  • Toru Hokari

    (Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences)

  • Seiji Murakoshi

    (Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba)

  • Masaki Iimura

    (Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba)

Abstract

Jackson and Watts (2002, J Econ Theory) study a dynamic process of network formation assuming that each player is myopic. In this note, we study the same dynamic process but assume that each player is farsighted. In particular, we consider a finite-horizon version of such a dynamic process in a model of market sharing agreements introduced by Belleframme and Bloch (2004, Int Econ Review), and investigate which networks are likely to be realized when the number of the players is three.

Suggested Citation

  • Toru Hokari & Seiji Murakoshi & Masaki Iimura, 2007. "Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(7), pages 1-14.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-06c70018
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ghosal, Sayantan & Ray, Debraj, 2005. "Farsighted network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 143-164, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yasunori Okumura, 2011. "A dynamic analysis of collusive networks," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(4), pages 317-336, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    finite horizon;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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