Technology Licensing to a Rival
Licensing a new technology implies introducing competition into the market. This has a negative effect on the profit of the incumbent if the demand remains unchanged. However, because of the novel content of an innovation, consumers may have different perceptions of the value of a good depending on the market structure. Thus, the introduction of a competitor into the market may enhance demand, and consequently have a positive effect on the profit of the incumbent. In a simple setting, we show that the incumbent may decide to license her technology even in the absence of a royalty when the positive effect outweighs the negative one.
Volume (Year): 12 (2005)
Issue (Month): 15 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Joseph Farrell & Nancy T. Gallini, 1988.
"Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 103(4), pages 673-694.
- Farrell, Joseph & Gallini, Nancy T., 1986. "Second-sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8zs1p5cc, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell and Nancy T. Gallini., 1987. "Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," Economics Working Papers 8760, University of California at Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell and Nancy T. Gallini., 1986. "Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," Economics Working Papers 8618, University of California at Berkeley.
- Farrell, Joseph & Gallini, Nancy T., 1987. "Second-sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4zr9b9dr, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, July.
- Kathleen R. Conner, 1995. "Obtaining Strategic Advantage from Being Imitated: When Can Encouraging "Clones" Pay?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(2), pages 209-225, February.
- Bousquet, Alain & Cremer, Helmuth & Ivaldi, Marc & Wolkowicz, Michel, 1998. "Risk sharing in licensing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 535-554, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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