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Players' Patience and Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model

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  • Tomohiko Kawamori

    (Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo)

Abstract

This paper investigates a generalized Baron-Ferejohn model with different discount factors, different recognition probabilities and q-majority rule. In the paper, it is shown that if players are sufficiently patient, recognition probabilities are similar and the voting rule is not unanimous, each player's equilibrium payoff is inversely proportional to the ratio of the player''s discount factor to the harmonic mean of all players'' discount factors. This result implies the followings: (i) A less patient player obtains a greater payoff (ii) As a player slightly becomes more patient, her payoff becomes smaller (iii) The equilibrium payoffs do not depend on recognition probabilities and (iv) They do not also depend on q.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomohiko Kawamori, 2005. "Players' Patience and Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(43), pages 1-5.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05c70027
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2005/Volume3/EB-05C70027A.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Marco A. Haan & Peter Kooreman, 2003. "How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 20(3), pages 509-522, June.
    3. Banks, Jeffrey s. & Duggan, John, 2000. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(1), pages 73-88, March.
    4. Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1990. "The Role of Risk Preferences in Bargaining When Acceptance of a Proposal Requires Less than Unanimous Approval," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 135-154, June.
    5. Eraslan, Hulya, 2002. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 11-30, March.
    6. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2004. "The curse of wealth and power," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 119-123, July.
    7. Yildirim, Huseyin, 2005. "Proposal Power and Majority Rule in Multilateral Bargaining with Costly Recognition," Working Papers 05-10, Duke University, Department of Economics.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Miller, Luis & Montero, Maria & Vanberg, Christoph, 2018. "Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 60-92.
    2. Daniel Cardona & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2016. "Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-17, May.
    3. Hülya Eraslan, 2016. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn model with risk-averse players," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 29-40, March.
    4. Maria Montero, 2008. "Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(2), pages 125-151, September.
    5. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2013. "Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 27-40, January.
    6. Maria Montero, 2015. "A Model of Protocoalition Bargaining with Breakdown Probability," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-18, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Baron-Ferejohn model (Legislative bargaining);

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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