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Strategische Reserve zur Absicherung des Strommarkts

Author

Listed:
  • Karsten Neuhoff
  • Jochen Diekmann
  • Wolf-Peter Schill
  • Sebastian Schwenen

Abstract

There is an ongoing discussion about whether the German electricity market offers sufficient incentives for investment in power plants and for keeping them connected to the grid, thus ensuring sufficient security of supply. Recommendations for further securing power supply include payments, some of them comprehensive, to power plant operators - in addition to energy revenues and based on their generating capacity ("capacity mechanisms"). Other suggestions are to keep individual power plants available that are used only during times of scarcity and high prices ("strategic reserve"). The present article analyzes the various reasons that could lead to a lack of incentives for investment and the extent to which they legitimize employing capacity mechanisms or require other approaches. It is concluded that a strategic reserve would suffice for securing generation adequacy, and finally, design options are discussed. Derzeit wird diskutiert, ob der deutsche Strommarkt genügend Anreize für Investitionen in Kraftwerke und deren Verbleiben am Netz bietet, um die Versorgungssicherheit zu gewährleisten. Vorschläge, die Energieversorgung weiter abzusichern, beinhalten zum Teil umfassende Zahlungen an die Kraftwerksbetreiber - parallel zu Energieerlösen und basierend auf deren Erzeugungskapazität (Kapazitätsmärkte). Andere Vorschläge empfehlen die Vorhaltung einzelner Kraftwerke, die nur bei Knappheit und hohen Preisen zum Einsatz kommen (Strategische Reserve). In der vorliegenden Studie werden die verschiedenen Gründe, die zu fehlenden Investitionsanreizen führen könnten, analysiert und Handlungsoptionen diskutiert. Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass eine Strategische Reserve zur Absicherung der Energieversorgung ausreicht.

Suggested Citation

  • Karsten Neuhoff & Jochen Diekmann & Wolf-Peter Schill & Sebastian Schwenen, 2013. "Strategische Reserve zur Absicherung des Strommarkts," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 80(48), pages 5-15.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwob:80-48-2
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Neuhoff, Karsten & Diekmann, Jochen & Kunz, Friedrich & Rüster, Sophia & Schill, Wolf-Peter & Schwenen, Sebastian, 2016. "A coordinated strategic reserve to safeguard the European energy transition," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 252-263.
    2. Karsten Neuhoff & Sophia Rüster & Sebastian Schwenen, 2015. "Power Market Design beyond 2020: Time to Revisit Key Elements?," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1456, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Sophia Rüster & Sebastian Schwenen, 2014. "Europäische Perspektive für Versorgungssicherheit auf Strommärkten notwendig," DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus 39, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2018. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Working Paper Series in Production and Energy 27, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP).
    5. Wolf-Peter Schill & Jochen Diekmann, 2014. "Die Kontroverse um Kapazitätsmechanismen für den deutschen Strommarkt," DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus 5, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Bublitz, Andreas & Keles, Dogan & Zimmermann, Florian & Fraunholz, Christoph & Fichtner, Wolf, 2019. "A survey on electricity market design: Insights from theory and real-world implementations of capacity remuneration mechanisms," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1059-1078.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    capacity mechanism; missing money; strategic reserve; Germany; . - renewable energy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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