IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/diw/diwvjh/73-20-10.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Entwicklungszusammenarbeit: Begrenzung der Korruption durch Abbau von Informationssperren

Author

Listed:
  • Georg Cremer

Abstract

Since 1996 when the World Bank dropped the taboos surrounding the problem of corruption, corruption control in development cooperation has become an ever-increasing field of action for donor organizations. Misappropriation secured by kickback arrangements between public officials and contractors poses the most significant risk of corruption in development aid projects. Risks exist in the state sector as well as in the realm of non-governmental organizations. Donor organizations can help reform efforts in developing countries achieve greater transparency by integrating corruption control into their project work. Administrative control processes play an important role here. However, their effectiveness is restricted by institutional conditions in many recipient countries. First signs of limiting corruption are rooted in controls more strongly oriented toward project effectiveness, in overcoming barriers to gathering information, in overcoming institutional obstacles that prevent donor organizations from perceiving corruption-related evidence, and in conduct on the part of donor organizations that changes the belief among recipients and contractors that corrupt acts bear no consequences. Korruptionskontrolle in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit wird zunehmend zu einem Handlungsfeld der Geberorganisationen, nachdem die Weltbank 1996 die Tabuisierung des Problems aufgegeben hatte. Das bei weitem bedeutendste Korruptionsrisiko in den Projekten der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist die Veruntreuung, abgesichert insbesondere durch Kick-back-Vereinbarungen zwischen Amtsträgern und Auftragnehmern. Die Risiken bestehen sowohl im staatlichen Sektor als auch bei Nichtregierungsorganisationen. Geberorganisationen können Reformansätze in Entwicklungsländern zu mehr Transparenz unterstützen, wenn sie die Korruptionskontrolle in ihre Projektarbeit integrieren. Administrative Kontrollverfahren sind dabei wichtig, haben aber unter den institutionellen Bedingungen vieler Empfängerländer nur eine begrenzte Wirkung. Ansätze zur Begrenzung der Korruption liegen in einer stärker an der Projektwirkung orientierten Kontrolle, in der Überwindung von Informationssperren und institutionellen Hemmnissen, die die Geberorganisationen dabei behindern, korruptionsrelevante Tatbestände wahrzunehmen, und in einem Verhalten der Geberorganisationen, das die Erwartung bei Empfängern und Auftragnehmern ändert, Korruption bliebe folgenlos.

Suggested Citation

  • Georg Cremer, 2004. "Entwicklungszusammenarbeit: Begrenzung der Korruption durch Abbau von Informationssperren," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(2), pages 318-329.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-20-10
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.73.2.318
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3790/vjh.73.2.318
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3790/vjh.73.2.318?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    2. Mr. Vito Tanzi & Mr. Hamid R Davoodi, 1997. "Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth," IMF Working Papers 1997/139, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Abida Naurin, 2023. "The Biased Nature of the Corruption Perception Index," PIDE Policy View Point 2023:41, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
    2. Blackburn, Keith & Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F., 2009. "Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 797-810, December.
    3. Keith Blackburn & Rashmi Sarmah, 2006. "Red Tape, Corruption and Finance," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 82, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    4. Keith Blackburn & Yuanyuan Wang, 2010. "Growth and Development Under Alternative Corruption Regimes," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 137, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    5. Bruna Bruno & Marisa Faggini, 2017. "Education, R&D, and social progress," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 7(1), pages 33-48, April.
    6. Friedrich Schneider & Dominik Enste, 1999. "Shadow Economies Around the World - Size, Causes, and Consequences," CESifo Working Paper Series 196, CESifo.
    7. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
    8. Wang, Li & Shao, Yuhui & Sun, Youxia & Wang, Yanan, 2023. "Rent-seeking, promotion pressure and green economic efficiency: Evidence from China," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 47(1).
    9. Shrabani Saha & Kunal Sen, 2019. "The corruption-growth relationship: Do political institutions matter?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2019-65, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    10. Ghulam Shabbir & Mumtaz Anwar & Shahid Adil, 2016. "Corruption, Political Stability and Economic Growth," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 55(4), pages 689-702.
    11. Zeeshan Noor Siddiqui, 2017. "Understanding the Linkage among Public Procurement (PP), Corruption, and Tax Morale (TM) Through Agency Theory (AT): A Review," Business & Economic Review, Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan, vol. 9(3), pages 258-288, September.
    12. Hellman, Joel S. & Jones, Geraint & Kaufmann, Daniel & Schankerman, Mark, 2000. "Measuring governance, corruption, and State capture - how firms and bureaucrats shape the business environment in transition economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2312, The World Bank.
    13. Alm, James & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McClellan, Chandler, 2016. "Corruption and firm tax evasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 146-163.
    14. Luca Correani, 2005. "Preferences, Development and Corruption Trap," Economia politica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 177-200.
    15. Vanessa da Silva Mariotto Onody & Ana Catarina Gandra de Carvalho & Eduardo Polloni-Silva & Guilherme Augusto Roiz & Enzo Barberio Mariano & Daisy Aparecida Nascimento Rebelatto & Herick Fernando Mora, 2022. "Corruption and FDI in Brazil: Contesting the “Sand” or “Grease” Hypotheses," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(10), pages 1-18, May.
    16. Keith Blackburn & Niloy Bose & M. Emranul Haque, 2011. "Public Expenditures, Bureaucratic Corruption And Economic Development," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(3), pages 405-428, June.
    17. Bienvenido Ortega & Antonio Casquero & Jesús Sanjuán, 2016. "Corruption and Convergence in Human Development: Evidence from 69 Countries During 1990–2012," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 127(2), pages 691-719, June.
    18. Eiji Yamamura, 2013. "Public sector corruption and the probability of technological disasters," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 233-255, August.
    19. Singh, Sunny Kumar & Bhattacharya, Kaushik, 2017. "Does easy availability of cash affect corruption? Evidence from a panel of countries," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 236-247.
    20. Kaddachi, Hayet & Ben Zina, Naceur, 2022. "The impact of corruption on economic growth in Tunisia: application of ARDL approach," MPRA Paper 114869, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2022.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-20-10. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bibliothek (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/diwbede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.