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Entwicklungszusammenarbeit: Begrenzung der Korruption durch Abbau von Informationssperren

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  • Georg Cremer

Abstract

Since 1996 when the World Bank dropped the taboos surrounding the problem of corruption, corruption control in development cooperation has become an ever-increasing field of action for donor organizations. Misappropriation secured by kickback arrangements between public officials and contractors poses the most significant risk of corruption in development aid projects. Risks exist in the state sector as well as in the realm of non-governmental organizations. Donor organizations can help reform efforts in developing countries achieve greater transparency by integrating corruption control into their project work. Administrative control processes play an important role here. However, their effectiveness is restricted by institutional conditions in many recipient countries. First signs of limiting corruption are rooted in controls more strongly oriented toward project effectiveness, in overcoming barriers to gathering information, in overcoming institutional obstacles that prevent donor organizations from perceiving corruption-related evidence, and in conduct on the part of donor organizations that changes the belief among recipients and contractors that corrupt acts bear no consequences. Korruptionskontrolle in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit wird zunehmend zu einem Handlungsfeld der Geberorganisationen, nachdem die Weltbank 1996 die Tabuisierung des Problems aufgegeben hatte. Das bei weitem bedeutendste Korruptionsrisiko in den Projekten der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist die Veruntreuung, abgesichert insbesondere durch Kick-back-Vereinbarungen zwischen Amtsträgern und Auftragnehmern. Die Risiken bestehen sowohl im staatlichen Sektor als auch bei Nichtregierungsorganisationen. Geberorganisationen können Reformansätze in Entwicklungsländern zu mehr Transparenz unterstützen, wenn sie die Korruptionskontrolle in ihre Projektarbeit integrieren. Administrative Kontrollverfahren sind dabei wichtig, haben aber unter den institutionellen Bedingungen vieler Empfängerländer nur eine begrenzte Wirkung. Ansätze zur Begrenzung der Korruption liegen in einer stärker an der Projektwirkung orientierten Kontrolle, in der Überwindung von Informationssperren und institutionellen Hemmnissen, die die Geberorganisationen dabei behindern, korruptionsrelevante Tatbestände wahrzunehmen, und in einem Verhalten der Geberorganisationen, das die Erwartung bei Empfängern und Auftragnehmern ändert, Korruption bliebe folgenlos.

Suggested Citation

  • Georg Cremer, 2004. "Entwicklungszusammenarbeit: Begrenzung der Korruption durch Abbau von Informationssperren," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(2), pages 318-329.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-20-10
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    File URL: http://ejournals.duncker-humblot.de/doi/pdf/10.3790/vjh.73.2.318
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    1. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
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