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L’impact de la gouvernance sur le niveau des disponibilités des entreprises : le cas du Japon

Author

Listed:
  • Pascal Nguyen

    () (UTS Business School et University of Technology Sydney)

  • Sophie Nivoix

    () (IAE de Poitiers, CEREGE)

Abstract

(VF) Dans cette étude portant sur un vaste échantillon de sociétés japonaises, nous montrons que, comme aux États-Unis, une bonne gouvernance se traduit par un niveau de disponibilités plus élevé. Toutefois, cette relation ne s’explique pas par le fait que les sociétés japonaises à faible gouvernance procèdent à plus d’investissements, mais résulte du fait que la qualité de leurs investissements est généralement moins bonne, ce qui conduit à des flux de liquidités plus faibles. Dans l’ensemble, cette étude démontre que l’impact négatif de la gouvernance sur les disponibilités observé sur la base d’indicateurs internationaux ne s’applique pas en utilisant les variables de gouvernance habituelles. (VA)In this study of a large sample of Japanese firms we show that, consistent with US findings, better governance structures are associated with larger cash holdings. However, this positive relation is not explained by the fact that Japanese firms with weaker governance structures are prone to overinvest, but stems from the fact that their investments exhibit significantly lower quality and thus generate lower cash flows. Overall, our results show that the negative relation between corporate governance and cash holdings observed in cross-country studies does not apply using standard governance variables.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Nguyen & Sophie Nivoix, 2011. "L’impact de la gouvernance sur le niveau des disponibilités des entreprises : le cas du Japon," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 14(4), pages 66-90, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:14:y:2011:i:q4:p:66-90.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    disponibilités; gouvernance; flexibilité; surinvestissement; Japon; cash; governance; flexibility; overinvestment; Japan.;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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