IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Les déterminants de l’activisme des actionnaires minoritaires:insuffisance de gouvernance affichée ou de résultats financiers?

  • Quôc Thai Huynh


    (Université Montesquieu Bordeaux 4)

Registered author(s):

    (VF)Depuis la loi NRE de 2001, le législateur a marqué son attachement au respect des règles de gouvernance formalisées depuis le rapport Viénot en 1995. Leur promotion a été relayée par des organismes de défense des actionnaires. Leur adoption se fait selon le principe de « respecter ou se justifier ». Malgré le signal positif qu’elles pourraient envoyer au marché, les firmes ne semblent pas toujours oeuvrer dans l’intérêt de leurs actionnaires. Cette étude recherche les relations entre le risque d’activisme, la gouvernance et la performance financière. Quel est le profil des sociétés ciblées par l’activisme des actionnaires minoritaires?(VA)Since the NRE Act of 2001, French lawmakers have expressed their commitment to the rules of governance as formalized in the Viénot report of 1995. Such rules are promoted by associations of shareholder- rights defense. Their adoption is based on the principle of "comply or explain". Despite the positive signal they could send to the market, firms not always conform with the best interests of their shareholders. This research studys relationships between shareholder activism, corporate governance and financial performance. What is the profile of companies targeted by minority shareholder activists?

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

    Volume (Year): 13 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 3 (September)
    Pages: 95-114.

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:13:y:2010:i:q3:p:95-114.
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Email:

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Terry, Rory L., 1994. "Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 371-390, June.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," NBER Working Papers 5879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Chi-Kun Ho, 2005. "Corporate Governance and Corporate Competitiveness: an international analysis," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 211-253, 03.
    5. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04.
    6. M. Albouy & A. Schatt, 2008. "Activisme des actionnaires minoritaires, proxy-fights et gouvernement des entreprises," Post-Print halshs-00355406, HAL.
    7. Stijn Claessens, 2006. "Corporate Governance and Development," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 21(1), pages 91-122.
    8. Carine Girard, 2001. "Une typologie de l'activisme des actionnaires minoritaires en France," Working Papers CREGO 1010101, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    9. Easterbrook, Frank H & Fischel, Daniel R, 1983. "Voting in Corporate Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 395-427, June.
    10. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December.
    11. Paul A. Gompers & Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2001. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," NBER Working Papers 8449, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, 2007. "The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 19(1), pages 55-73.
    13. Michel Albouy & Alain Schatt, 2004. "Les prises de contrôle par les actionnaires contestataires:le cas André," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie,, vol. 7(2), pages 33-65, June.
    14. Gérard Charreaux, 2008. "À la recherche du lien perdu entre caractéristiques des dirigeants et performance de la firme : gouvernance et latitude managériale," Working Papers CREGO 1080502, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    15. Martin Conyon & Simon Peck, 1998. "Board size and corporate performance: evidence from European countries," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 291-304.
    16. Clifford G. Holderness, 2003. "A survey of blockholders and corporate control," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 51-64.
    17. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
    18. Thonet, P J & Poensgen, O H, 1979. "Managerial Control and Economic Performance in Western Germany," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 23-37, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:13:y:2010:i:q3:p:95-114.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gérard Charreaux)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.