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Efficiency, enforcement and revenue tradeoffs in participatory forest management: an example from Tanzania

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Listed author(s):
  • Robinson, Elizabeth J. Z.
  • Lokina, Razack B.

Abstract

Where joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collection.

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File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1355770X11000209
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Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal Environment and Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (2012)
Issue (Month): 01 (February)
Pages: 1-20

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Handle: RePEc:cup:endeec:v:17:y:2012:i:01:p:1-20_00
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Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK

Web page: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_EDE
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Cited by:

  1. Dambala Gelo & Steven F. Koch & Edwin Muchapondwah, 2013. "Do the Poor Benefit from Devolution Policies? Evidences from Quantile Treatment Effect Evaluation of Joint Forest Management," Working Papers 201388, University of Pretoria, Department of Economics.
  2. Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z. & Albers, Heidi J. & Ngeleza, Guyslain & Lokina, Razack B., 2014. "Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: An example from Tanzania," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 242-248.
  3. Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson & Heidi J. Albers & Charles Meshack & Razack B. Lokina, 2013. "Implementing REDD through community‐based forest management: Lessons from Tanzania," Natural Resources Forum, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 0(3), pages 141-152, 08.
  4. Salas, Paula Cordero, 2014. "Implementation of REDD+ mechanisms in Tanzania," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6815, The World Bank.
  5. Gelo, Dambala & Koch, Steven F., 2014. "The Impact of Common Property Right Forestry: Evidence from Ethiopian Villages," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 395-406.
  6. Ameha, Aklilu & Nielsen, Oystein Juul & Larsen, Helle Overgard, 2014. "Impacts of access and benefit sharing on livelihoods and forest: Case of participatory forest management in Ethiopia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 162-171.
  7. Gelo, Dambala & Muchapondwa, Edwin & Koch, Steven F., 2016. "Decentralization, market integration and efficiency-equity trade-offs: Evidence from Joint Forest Management in Ethiopian villages," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 1-23.

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