Opportunistic renegotiation of infrastructure concessions as rent seeking: the effect of legal systems Gabriel Garcia Morales
This paper examines the problem of renegotiation of infrastructure concessions in Latin America using a model of litigation with an application to incentive contracts. Opportunistic renegotiation is here defined as a rent seeking game, to show the effect of the legal system characteristics in the probability of renegotiation. A main conclusion is that legal systems where each party pays for their own legal expenses, such as the American, are more prone to opportunistic renegotiation. On the other hand, systems, such as the British, that concentrates legal expenses in one party might discourage opportunistic behavior by making it more costly.
Volume (Year): (2011)
Issue (Month): ()
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- Klein, Daniel B., 1990.
"The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of Early America,"
University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers
qt2587p3z1, University of California Transportation Center.
- Klein, Daniel B, 1990. "The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of Early America," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 788-812, October.
- Klein, D., 1989. "The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies Of Early America," Papers 89-08, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
- Klein, Daniel, 1990. "The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of Early America," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt0js4r8h9, University of California Transportation Center.
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