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The Devil’s in the Details: Evaluating the One Person, One Vote Principle in American Politics

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  • Jeffrey W. Ladewig

    (Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut, 365 Fairfield Way, Storrs, CT 06269, USA)

  • Seth C. McKee

    (Department of Political Science, Texas Tech University , 113 Holden Hall, Lubbock, TX 79409, USA)

Abstract

Ever since the Supreme Court instituted the one person, one vote principle in congressional elections based on its decision in Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), intrastate deviations from equal district populations have become smaller and smaller after each decennial reapportionment. Relying on equal total population as the standard to meet the Court’s principle, though, has raised some constitutional and practical questions stemming from, most basically, not every person has the right to vote. Specifically, there is considerable deviation between the current redistricting practices and a literal interpretation of this constitutional principle. This study systematically analyzes the differences between districts’ total populations and their voting age populations (VAPs). Further, we consider how congressional reapportionments since 1972 would change if, instead of states’ total populations, the standard for reapportioning seats were based on the VAP or the voting eligible population (VEP). Overall, the results indicate that the debate surrounding the appropriate apportionment and redistricting standard is not just normative, it also has notable practical consequences.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey W. Ladewig & Seth C. McKee, 2014. "The Devil’s in the Details: Evaluating the One Person, One Vote Principle in American Politics," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 2(1), pages 4-31.
  • Handle: RePEc:cog:poango:v:2:y:2014:i:1:p:4-31
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Scott W. Desposato & John R. Petrocik, 2003. "The Variable Incumbency Advantage: New Voters, Redistricting, and the Personal Vote," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(1), pages 18-32, January.
    2. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Gerber, Alan & Snyder, Jim, 2002. "Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 96(4), pages 767-777, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan Cervas & Bernard Grofman, 2020. "Legal, Political Science, and Economics Approaches to Measuring Malapportionment: The U.S. House, Senate, and Electoral College 1790–2010," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2238-2256, October.

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