Minorities and majorities: a dynamic model of assimilation
The paper analyses the population dynamics of a country that has two ethnic groups, a minority and a majority, and minority members can choose to assimilate into the majority. Depending on the minority's size, the long-run outcome can be full or no assimilation. Under certain parameter values multiple equilibria exist, including the two extreme cases. The paper demonstrates that both the long-run outcome and the equilibrium path may be inefficient. Two extensions to the basic model are considered. The first one allows for a comparison between a multicultural and a `melting pot' society. The second one introduces population growth and studies the interplay between exogenous and endogenous changes in the minority's size.
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Volume (Year): 38 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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