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Nutzen der Wirtschaftsprüfung

Author

Listed:
  • Reto Eberle
  • Christian Jaag
  • Christian Bach
  • Sonia Strube Martins
  • Fabian Feger

Abstract

Der Nutzen der Wirtschaftsprüfung liegt in der Validierung von Unternehmensinformation. Für die Anspruchsgruppen eines Unternehmens ist Information als Grundlage für ihre Entscheidun-gen von zentraler Bedeutung. Information wird allerdings erst dann vorbehaltslos wertvoll und brauchbar für eine Anspruchsgruppe, wenn sie entweder durch die Anspruchsgruppe selbst er-stellt wurde, oder wenn sie durch eine unabhängige und qualifizierte Stelle nach objektiven und standardisierten Kriterien geprüft wurde. Diese Prüfung wertvoller Unternehmensinformation und die Reduktion von Defiziten leistet die Wirtschaftsprüfung. Das Vorgehen der Studie gliedert sich in drei Teile. Im ersten Teil werden unter Einbeziehung von Expertengesprächen konkrete Bedürfnisse sowie Defizite an Unternehmensinformation von Anspruchsgruppen erfasst und bewertet. Darauf aufbauend wird in einem zweiten Teil evaluiert, welchen Anteil an den Informationsdefiziten die Wirtschaftsprüfung abzubauen vermag. Unter Wirtschaftsprüfung wird dabei ausschliesslich die gesetzlich verankerte externe Revision ver-standen. Im dritten Teil wird basierend auf etablierten Theorien aus der ökonomischen Literatur analysiert, inwiefern der Abbau von Informationsdefiziten durch die Wirtschaftsprüfung für die Gesamtwirtschaft wertvoll ist.

Suggested Citation

  • Reto Eberle & Christian Jaag & Christian Bach & Sonia Strube Martins & Fabian Feger, 2014. "Nutzen der Wirtschaftsprüfung," Studies and Reports, Swiss Economics, pages 1-122, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:chc:studse:0012
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    File URL: http://www.swiss-economics.ch/RePEc/files/S0012WP.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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