Value neutrality and the question of ends in teleological economic definitions

The principle of value neutrality has long shaped mainstream economic thought, particularly through Robbins’ influential definition of economics as the science that studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means with alternative uses. This definition, widely adopted in economics textbooks, excludes ethical evaluation of the ends, positioning them as given and beyond the scope of economic inquiry. However, this purported neutrality conceals a normative stance that limits the field’s ability to engage with questions of human well-being and collective purpose. To address this issue, the teleological character of Robbins’ definition will be examined first, which focuses on the means and takes the ends as given, in contrast to two historical conceptions of economics: as the study of wealth and as the science of exchange (catallactics). Subsequently, the paper will focus on Homo Economicus, the agent responsible for the execution of the means and who makes himself up as a teleological subject. Finally, the idea of how ethics can be integrated into a definition of economics will be presented.