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Politische Folgen finanzwissenschaftlicher Konzepte / Political consequence of public finance

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  • Blankart Charles B.

Abstract

The first part of the paper describes concepts and consequences of public finance in the past such as Roman governance, medieval feudalism, political anarchy, German cameralism and French mercantilism. These concepts are then confronted with actual concepts of public finance such as British optimal taxation and public choice. The former considers the welfare costs of taxation, but ignores the opportunity costs of competing projects. The latter integrates both, welfare economics and opportunity costs in the constitutional concept of a citizens′ tax.

Suggested Citation

  • Blankart Charles B., 2015. "Politische Folgen finanzwissenschaftlicher Konzepte / Political consequence of public finance," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 61-80, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:66:y:2015:i:1:p:61-80:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2015-0105
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    References listed on IDEAS

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